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Some of our thoughts involve reference to particular
individual entities. Philosophers call these kinds of
thoughts ‘singular thoughts.’ Russell was a great phi-
losopher, you’re standing on my foot, I’m tired, that
raccoon got into my garbage last night – these are all
singular thoughts because each involves reference to a
particular thing: Russell, you, me, and a certain rac-
coon, respectively. As these examples indicate, singu-
lar thoughts are usually expressed by sentences
containing proper names (e.g., ‘Russell’), indexicals
(e.g., ‘you’ and ‘I’), and demonstrative expressions
(e.g., ‘that raccoon’).
Singular Thoughts as Object Dependent
Some philosophers maintain that singular thoughts
are object dependent, by which they mean that the
intentional content of the thought essentially involves
the object that it is about, in the sense that the thought
content would not be available to a thinker were the
object not to exist. More precisely, a singular thought
is object dependent just in case its content is such that
(1) its existence depends on the existence of the object
thought about, and (2) its identity depends on the
identity of the object thought about. For example,
consider the thought that raccoon got into my gar-
bage last night, had by me while spying a particular
raccoon skulking in my backyard. According to the
doctrine of object dependence, if, counterfactually, no
raccoon had in fact been there to be singled out by
me, owing perhaps to my delusional or hallucinatory
state of mind – let us call this the ‘‘empty possibility’’ –
then there would have been no singular thought con-
tent for me to entertain. Consequently, my psycholog-
ical condition in this situationwould be different from
what it is in the actual situation.Moreover, if, counter-
factually, my thought had singled out a qualitatively
indistinguishable but numerically different raccoon
instead – call this the ‘‘duplicate possibility’’ – then
the resulting thought would have had a different
content from the content that my thought had in the
actual situation. Again, my overall psychological state
in this duplicate possibility is different from what it
actually is. The implication here for linguistic mean-
ing is that the meaning of sentences containing genu-
ine singular terms (e.g., proper names, indexicals, and
demonstrative expressions) depends on the singular
terms in question successfully referring to objects.
On this view, nonfictional sentences containing non-
referring singular terms, such as empty or bearerless
names, are meaningless, in the sense that they fail to
express any thoughts.
The doctrine of object dependence is a species of the
more general doctrine of externalism about thought
content, according to which some states of mind are
such that we can be in them only if we bear certain
appropriate relations to other things in our environ-
ment, and thus is opposed to internalism about the
mind, according towhich the contents of our thoughts
are never dependent on any relations between us and
other things in our environment. (Some philosophers,
such as Burge [1982], accept the general doctrine of
externalism but reject object dependence.)
Epistemological Consequences of
Object-Dependence
It is controversial which, if any, singular thoughts are
object dependent. Arguably, first-person thoughts ex-
pressed with the indexical ‘I’ are object dependent: it
seems obvious that if I did not exist, then the thought
that I now express with the sentence I’m tired could
not exist; moreover, no one else could have had the
very same thought. But the thesis that singular
thoughts expressed with proper names and demon-
stratives are object dependent has seemed paradoxi-
cal to some philosophers. For when the idea of object
dependence is applied to these other types of singular
thoughts, it runs up against a strongly held intuition
about the nature of thought content, namely, that we
have a kind of direct, noninferential knowledge of
the contents of our thoughts, in the sense that we
know, just by thinking, whether we are having a
thought and, moreover, what thought we are having.













The doctrine of object dependence seems to contra-
vene this intuition about the epistemology of thought.
For, first of all, condition (1) above allows the
possibility that a thinker could suffer the illusion of
entertaining a thought when he was not in fact doing
so. If, unbeknown to me, I am in what we have been
calling an empty possibility and am hallucinating a
raccoon rather than actually seeing one, it may seem
to me that I am having a singular thought, which
I might try to express with the sentence that raccoon
got into my garbage last night, even though I am not.
But is this kind of cognitive illusion really possible? It
is very tempting to think, against this, that if it seems
to me as if I am having a thought with a certain
content, then I am. Perhaps I might be mistaken
about which object, if any, my thought is about –
but how could I be mistaken about whether I was
even thinking a thought at all?
Condition (2) has also seemed problematic. Con-
sider what we have called the duplicate counterfactual
possibility, in which I see a different raccoon, qualita-
tively indistinguishable from the one I actually see,
and think that raccoon got into my garbage last night.
In such a case, everything will seem the same to me:
the duplicate raccoon does not appear to affect my
conscious awareness in any way different from how
the actual raccoon affects it. But is not subjective
indistinguishability the criterion for sameness and
difference of thought content? Opponents of object
dependence argue that in order for there to be a
genuinely psychological or mental difference between
the two cases, this difference must impinge on my
conscious awareness in some way. The object-
dependent theorist denies this, arguing that it is the
product of a mistaken internalist picture of the mind,
a picture that the object-dependent theorist urges us
to reject in favor of an externalist view. The debate
between object-dependent theorists and their oppo-
nents is thus linked to a certain extent to the larger
debate between internalism and externalism about
thought content.
The Central Motivation for Object
Dependence
A number of different considerations have been ad-
vanced in favor of an object-dependent conception of
singular thought, and many involve a synthesis of key
ideas of Frege and Russell (Evans, 1982; McDowell,
1977, 1984, 1986; McCulloch, 1989). Advocates of
this form of object dependence are often labeled ‘neo-
Fregeans,’ which can be confusing, because object-
dependent singular thoughts are also often called
‘Russellian thoughts,’ so one needs to be aware of
differing terminology here.
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the object-
dependent theorists’ point of view is to begin by
noting that they do countenance thoughts that in a
certain sense concern particular individuals but that
would be available to a thinker were those individuals
not to exist. Moreover, there is a straightforward
sense in which the contents of these kinds of thoughts
would remain unaffected were duplicate objects sub-
stituted for the actual ones. Calling these kinds of
thoughts object-independent thoughts, we can say
that although they concern particulars, the relation
between their contents and their objects is much less
direct or intimate than the relation between the
contents and objects of object-dependent thoughts
(the idea goes back to Russell’s seminal distinction
[1910–1911] between knowledge by description and
knowledge by acquaintance).
The most obvious examples of object-independent
thoughts are thoughts that involve definite description
concepts, thoughts of the form the F isG. Consider the
thought the first man on the moon was an American.
As it happens, this thought is about Neil Armstrong
because he was in fact the first man on the moon. But
consider now the empty possibility in which the lunar
landing was a hoax and the definite description the
first man on the moon fails to designate anything.
The object-dependent theorist holds that even though
the thought fails to single out any actual object in the
world, the thought still has a content, a content
expressed, in part, by the definite description. Simi-
larly, consider the duplicate possibility, in which Neil
Armstrong’s identical twin is the first man on the
moon. Despite the thought’s picking out a different
man, the content of the thought remains the same –
again, that expressed (in part) by the definite descrip-
tion the first man on the moon. The crucial point here
is that the intentional content of the thought can be
specified independently of the object, if any, that it is
about.
The object-dependent theorist’s idea is this.
Thought content is essentially representational: it re-
presents the world as being a certain way; it lays
down conditions that the world must meet in order
for the thought to be true. That is to say, the content
of a thought determines its truth conditions. In the
case of a thought employing a definite description
concept the F (a descriptive thought, for short), the
thinker knows what those conditions are without
knowing which object, if any, the thought concerns.
If I say to you the first man on the moon was Ameri-
can, it is not necessary for you to know which object
is the first man on the moon, nor even that there
is such an object, in order for you to understand
what I have said, in order for you to ‘‘grasp’’ the
thought I expressed with this sentence. So long as
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you understand all the words in the sentence and their
mode of combination, you know exactly how the
world is represented as being; you know what the
thought is ‘‘saying’’ about reality. In other words,
you know that the thought is true just in case there
is a unique man who was first on the moon and who
was American. It does not matter who this man hap-
pens to be – Neil Armstrong, his identical twin, or
Buzz Aldrin. So long as there is such a man, the
thought is true; and if there is no such man – either
because no man at all has ever been on the moon or
because more than one man stepped onto the moon at
exactly the same time – then the thought is false. The
representational content of a descriptive thought is
thus independent of any object that the content might
be about. The truth conditions make no reference to
any man in particular.
When it comes to singular thoughts, however, the
object-dependent theorist maintains that their repre-
sentational content is not independent of any object
the content is about. On the contrary, the content
requires that a certain particular object be picked
out. In order to understand or grasp the thought in
question, one must know which particular object this
is. Consider the foregoing example of a singular
thought: that raccoon got into my garbage last
night, based on my visual experience of a particular
raccoon in my backyard (these kinds of singular
thoughts are sometimes called ‘perceptual demon-
strative thoughts’). Now, in having this thought, I am
representing the world in a certain way. What way is
this exactly? Well, I am not representing the world as
merely containing a raccoon that got into my garbage
last night, whichever raccoon that might be. The way
I am representing the world as being involves that
very raccoon. My thought is true just in case that
raccoon (the very one I saw) got into my garbage
last night; and in order for you to have this thought
too, you need to know which particular raccoon is
singled out by my perceptual demonstrative ‘that rac-
coon.’ Contrast this with the very different case in
which I think the descriptive thought the cleverest
and boldest raccoon in the neighborhood got into
my garbage last night. All that it takes for this thought
to be true is for there to be a unique raccoon, who is
cleverer and bolder than all the rest and who got into
my garbage – and you can grasp this thought without
knowing which raccoon, if any, that was. If it turns
out that there was no such raccoon, then my thought
is straightforwardly false. But the truth conditions for
my perceptual demonstrative thought make essential
reference to the very object it is about. The truth or
falsity of this thought of mine turns on the condition
of a particular raccoon, namely, that raccoon – so that
if there is no such creature, if (say) I am hallucinating,
there is nothing in the world to count as my thought
being true or false. Consequently, in this empty possi-
bility, my mental episode, whatever exactly its nature,
has no truth conditions (for, to repeat, there is noth-
ing of which I have judged to have a certain property;
nor have I made the mere existential claim that there
is an object with a certain property). Since thought
content is essentially truth conditional, according to
the object-dependent theorist, I have not in fact had a
singular thought at all, only the illusion of one.
Whether considerations like these in favor of object
dependence apply equally to other kinds of singular
thoughts, such as those expressed with proper names
and indexicals (other than ‘I’), is a further question.
Criticisms and Rivals
Various criticisms have been leveled at the object-
dependent conception of singular thought. Some
of these arise from problems that the conception
inherits from the general doctrine of externalism,
such as its apparent conflict with certain features of
self-knowledge (Davies, 1998). Three issues, how-
ever, stand out with respect to object dependence in
particular.
The first is the question of what is going on, psy-
chologically speaking, in the minds of deluded sub-
ject in empty possibilities who suffer the illusion of
entertaining singular thoughts. Their minds are not
phenomenological blanks, after all; yet, according to
the object-dependent theorist, they are not filled with
any singular thoughts. Are such deluded subjects hav-
ing any thoughts at all? If so, what kinds of thoughts
are they having?
The second issue is closely related to the first and
concerns the commonsense psychological explana-
tion of the actions of deluded subjects. Normally, we
explain agents’ actions – my charging into the back-
yard, say – by attributing singular thoughts to them –
the belief that that raccoon got into my garbage last
night, for example. But now consider my deluded
duplicate who, after hallucinating a raccoon in the
empty possibility, engages in the very same type of
behavior of charging into the backyard. According to
the object-dependent theorist, my duplicate here has
no singular thought; that is, he has no belief the con-
tent of which is that raccoon got into my garbage last
night. But, although he is hallucinating, his action is
perfectly rational and so is presumably psychological-
ly explicable by ordinary commonsense standards.
But how do we so explain his behavior without attri-
buting a singular thought to him (McDowell, 1977;
Segal, 1989)? Moreover, if we can explain his behav-
ior without attributing a singular thought to him,
then why can we not do the same with me in the
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actual situation? But if we can do this with me too,
then it looks as if the ascription of object-dependent
singular thoughts is ‘psychologically redundant’ –
and that allegedly calls into question their very exis-
tence (Noonan, 1986, 1991; Segal, 1989).
The third issue, perhaps the most serious, is that
there are powerful rival object-independent concep-
tions of singular thought, which are free of many of
the problems that beset object-dependent theories.
There tend to be two different kinds of alternative
conceptions.
The first of these conceptions attempts to analyze
singular thought content in wholly general or descrip-
tive terms, in such a way that the same content can
exist in duplicate and empty possibilities, in the man-
ner of thoughts involving definite description con-
cepts, discussed earlier (Schiffer, 1978; Searle, 1983,
1991; Blackburn, 1984: chapter 9). For example, we
might try to analyze the content of the demonstrative
expression that raccoon as equivalent to the content
of the definite description the raccoon I am seeing
now or the raccoon causing this visual experience.
The second approach opposes this kind of descrip-
tive reduction and maintains a genuinely singular
conception of singular thought but argues that a dis-
tinction between irreducibly singular (or ‘‘de re’’)
content and object can still be drawn, again, in such
a way that, as with the first alternative, the same
singular content can exist in both duplicate and
empty possibilities (Burge, 1977, 1982, 1983, 1991;
Bach, 1987; Segal, 1989). This approach exploits an
analogy between the semantics of sentences contain-
ing demonstratives and pronouns (this is red, she is
tall) and the semantics of the open sentences of a
logical system (x is red, x is tall) – namely, that both
kinds of sentences are true or false only under an
assignment of values to the demonstratives, pro-
nouns, and free variables in question. The proposal
is to treat a sentence such as that is a raccoon as like a
predicate, or open sentence in the logician’s sense, and
to think of it as expressing a single content (a ‘‘pro-
positionally incomplete’’ content) that is mentally ap-
plied, in different situations, to different objects, and
even, in some situations, to no object at all.
These two alternatives each face their own difficul-
ties, however. The first alternative seems to overintel-
lectualize thinking. When I think that raccoon got
intomy garbage last night, I do not appear to be think-
ing about myself or the present moment or about
causation or my own visual experiences, and even if
I were doing so in a philosophical mood, it does not
seem necessary for a creature to have such sophisti-
cated concepts in order for it to have singular thoughts
(McDowell, 1991; Burge, 1991; Searle, 1991). As for
the second alternative, it is not clear to what extent
it departs from the intuitive principle that thought
content is fully representational in the sense of always
determining truth conditions. For in the empty coun-
terfactual possibility, in which I hallucinate a rac-
coon, no value will be assigned to the demonstrative
concept in my thought (that raccoon), and hence
no truth conditions for the overall thought will be
determined. The advocates of this second alternative
approach thus seem committed to the view that
I can have thoughts that possess no truth conditions,
something that may give us pause.
See also: Counterfactuals; Descriptions, Definite and In-
definite: Philosophical Aspects; Dthat; Empty Names; Ex-
ternalism about Content; Frege, Gottlob (1848–1925);
Immunity to Error through Misidentification; Indexicality:
Philosophical Aspects; Proper Names: Philosophical
Aspects; Reference: Philosophical Theories; Russell,
Bertrand (1872–1970); Truth Conditional Semantics and
Meaning; Two-Dimensional Semantics.
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Does moral discourse purport to be objective? If
so, can its objectivist pretensions be justified? Rough-
ly speaking, to say that some form of discourse is
objective is to say that there is a single set of truths
about whatever subject matter the discourse is about.
We can make this rough characterization more
precise by formulating a number of related theses –
objectivity theses – that collectively capture this idea
of objectivity:
Cognitivism: Declarative sentences of the discourse
in question are used by speakers to make genuine
assertions and function mainly to exp ess the speak-
er’s beliefs. Given that (sincere) belief and assertion
aim at representing what is true, such sentences are
capable of being true or false.
Truth: Some affirmative sentences of the discourse
are true.
Independence: What makes some sentence of the
discourse true is that it corresponds to some fact –
where the existence and nature of the specific fact to
which the sentence corresponds is independent of the
attitudes and beliefs that individuals and groups have
toward the fact in question. It is common to use the
word ‘stance’ to refer to the beliefs and attitudes of
individuals and groups, so using this terminology we
may express the independence thesis by saying that
for the discourse in question there is a stance-inde-
pendent reality (realm of facts) that the discourse is
about, and the facts comprising that reality are what
make certain sentences of that discourse true.
Convergence: Ideally, use of the proper methods of
inquiry (which may differ from discourse to dis-
course) may be expected to lead individuals (at least
under suitably ideal conditions) to converge in a great
many of their judgments about the subject matter of
the discourse in question.
Discourse satisfying these four theses involves sen-
tences that are (or may be) objectively true and
hence we may say that the discourse itself is objective.
Of course, it is possible for some realm of discourse to
feature claims that purport to be objectively true
but fail to be so because one or more of the above
theses fail to hold in relation to the discourse in
question – a possibility to which we shall return
below.
Moral objectivism, then, at least as it is commonly
understood by philosophers, is the view that all four
theses hold in relation to moral discourse: not only
does moral discourse purport to be objective, it satis-
fies the objectivity requirements in question and thus
some moral judgments are objectively true. Some-
times this is put by saying that there is a single true
morality. As we shall see, some philosophers have
denied one or more of the four theses in relation
to moral discourse and thus denied that morality is
objective.
Determining whether moral objectivism is correct
requires an examination of fundamental philosophical
questions about the meaning, truth, and justification
of moral judgments – questions central to that branch
of ethics called ‘meta-ethics.’ But it also requires an
examination of the very notion of objectivity. And
here we find two models of objectivity. One of them
is inspired by discourse about the physical world
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